The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance
Volume 19
Issue 1 Spring 2017

Article 2

2-2017

News Management around Equity Private Placements
HSIAO-CHEN LIANG
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology

WOAN-YUH JANG
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons

Recommended Citation
LIANG, HSIAO-CHEN and JANG, WOAN-YUH (2017) "News Management around Equity Private
Placements," The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance: Vol. 19: Iss. 1.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.57229/2373-1761.1291
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/jef/vol19/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Graziadio School of Business and Management at
Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance by an
authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

THE JOURNAL OF ENTREPRENEURIAL FINANCE

VOLUME 19, NO. 1 (SPRING 2017) 35-82

News Management around Equity Private Placements
Hsiao-Chen Liang1
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology
Department of Business Administration
Woan-Yuh Jang
National Taiwan University of Science and Technology
Graduate Institute of Finance

ABSTRACT
Private placement is the sale of securities to a limited number of qualified institutions or high-wealth
investors. Although private placement is favorable for firms raising capital, it is relatively easy for managers
to exploit it to benefit specific investors. Using a sample of Taiwanese private placements covering 2006 to
2010, we use both quantitative and qualitative variables to examine the determinants of the valence and
tenor of media coverage around private placement announcements and study whether managers
strategically perform news management. The results show that issuers will engage in news management
around private placement announcements to facilitate the issue process. This phenomenon is more
obvious if no insiders are participating in the placements. Voluntarily released news is more
forward-looking and positive. These types of news provide investors with the issuers’ anticipated future
prospects and are relatively easy to create. The results also suggest that private placements are useful for
resolving adverse selection and moral hazard problems through media power.
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I. Introduction
Private placement, the sale of securities to a limited number of qualified
institutions or high-wealth investors, has become an important financing vehicle,
especially for small businesses, because of its quick and simple issue process (Fenn
2000; Krishnamurthy et al. 2005). In addition to being useful for a variety of corporate
objectives, such as growth financing, recapitalizations, deleveraging, shareholder
liquidity, structured investments and acquisition financing, private placements can also
help reduce information asymmetry (Allen and Phillips 2000; Cronqvist and Nilsson
2005; Hertzel and Rees 1998) and enhance monitoring (Hertzel and Smith 1993;
Wruck 1989).
Information asymmetry is a very important issue in the capital market. It is a
common phenomenon that can hinder the normal operation of financial markets, and
everything possible must be done to eliminate it and thus enhance transparency. The
media is the vehicle through which information about firms coming from many
channels, such as company press releases, security analysts, and media workers
(Deephouse 2000), is delivered to investors. Though this process may substantially
reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors, the financial literature
suggests that managers tend to manipulate the media to achieve specific goals, even
self-interest. For example, Ho et al. (2010) note that opportunistic behavior is observed
in Taiwanese firms conducting initial public offerings (IPOs), and find that issuers are
also inclined to influence investors’ views on firms’ future prospects (except those
concerning earnings management) by disclosing their operational advantages and
strategic plans. One common approach is releasing news to the media. Through news
management, firms can enhance their public image to facilitate equity issues. In
another IPO study, Jang (2007) finds that firms hype the media in the IPO process.
She shows that the volume and tenor of media-provided information increases noise
traders’ demand for newly listed shares, leading to both a greater IPO underpricing and
a higher trading turnover. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that issuers increase
corporate disclosure activity during the six-month period before a seasoned equity
offering (SEO), especially for the categories of disclosure over which managers have
greater discretion. They suggest that the purpose of disclosure is not only to reduce
information asymmetry but also to hype their stock to reduce cost of capital.
Although private placement is favorable for firms raising capital, it is relatively
easy for managers to exploit it to benefit specific investors, as shares are placed with
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selected investors. Accounts of such exploitation are pervasive in the private placement
literature. For example, Wu (2004) and Barclay et al. (2007) discuss managerial
self-dealing in private placements, and He et al. (2011) find that private placement
issuers appear to pursue income-increasing earnings management around private
placements. Unlike in developed countries, almost 70% of Taiwan equity trading
volume is generated by individual investors who tend to be less informed, lack
professional experience or training and, therefore, inclined to follow market
information. Thus, several questions emerge. In private placement financing, how do
the two mechanisms for reducing information asymmetry—media disclosure and
private placements complement each other? What is the role of the media in private
placements? Since both the media and private placements have the same function of
mitigating information asymmetry, does managerial manipulation of the media appear
among the other capital raising alternatives also exist in private placements?
In this study, we investigate news management around private placement
announcements using a sample of private placements announced between January
2006 and December 2010 by firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and
the Gre-Tai Securities Market (OTC). Following the method used by Brockman et al.
(2008), we employ SRET and GN as proxies for the valence of media coverage. Thus,
SRET equals the three-day abnormal returns around news reports. If SRET is positive
(negative), the news is classified as good news (bad news) and GN is equal to 1 (0).
However, both SRET and GN are measured under the efficient market hypothesis that
the stock price has fully and instantaneously reflected publicly available information.
To make our research more robust, we also adopt a measure, TENOR, to analyze
managers’ information disclosure around the event date. TENOR being measured by
content analysis is also used by Deephouse (2000) and Pollock and Rindova (2003)
that read and judge the tenor of statements released in news reports. As suggested by
Pollock and Rindova (2003), in a market with many professional investors,
media-provided information will have a systematic impact on investor behavior.
DeFleur et al. (1992) also suggest that audience memory is substantially stronger for
news stories reported by newspapers. Although some news is authored on the media’s
own initiative rather than by a company source, Deephouse (2000) argues that the
media are unlikely to report on a firm if the firm has not taken any action. Therefore,
most news must come from company press releases, transmitted verbatim or edited by
the media. We therefore consider that media-provided information, such as news
published in popular newspapers and on the Internet, is the most appropriate object of
a study on managerial disclosure behavior around private placement announcements.
Although many research designs are based on the efficient market hypothesis (eg.
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Brockman et al. 2008), abnormal return anomalies occur in most emerging markets,
such as the Taiwan stock market. Research also shows that stock prices in emerging
markets are strongly affected by political events and rumors because this information is
relatively opaque, and most investors are noisy traders in this environment (Morck et
al. 2000; Ho et al. 2010). For robustness purposes, we use both quantitative (SRET
and GN) and qualitative (TENOR) variables to measure the valence or tenor of media
coverage. All research methodologies have advantages and disadvantages. The
quantitative method used by Brockman et al. (2008) is easy to conduct, but it has more
restrictions when applied to a less developed capital market. The qualitative method
used by Deephouse (2000) can provide more direct evidence, but it requires more time
for news reading, and its judgments of tone are subjective. Our study contributes to the
development of methodologies for use in the literature on financial news management.
For researchers working with data drawn from developing financial markets, the
findings using both qualitative and quantitative variables provide robust support for
their conclusions.
Our study also adds to the private placement literature concerning news
management. The literature on information disclosure, such as studies on IPO
underpricing (Pollock and Rindova 2003; Jang 2007), generally regards the tenor of
media coverage as a determinant of certain financial events. By contrast, our research
examines the determinants of media coverage in private placements; we use the valence
and tenor of media coverage as the outcome variables. Moreover, the extant private
placement literature focuses on the determinants and consequences of private
placement decisions, such as the motives for choosing private placements (Brooks and
Graham 2005; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2005; Sharpe and Woo 2005; Wu 2004), the
announcement effects and pricing in private placements (Wruck 1989; Hertzel and
Smith 1993; Anderson et al. 2006),2 the reasons for long-run stock and operating
underperformance following private placements (Hertzel et al. 2002; Chou et al. 2009;
Marciukaityte et al. 2005), and investor identity in private placements (Barclay et al.
2007; Krishnamurthy et al. 2005; Wruck and Wu 2009). We expand the topic’s
research domain by investigating if managers manipulate the media to facilitate private
placements.
The results show that issuers will engage in news management around private
placement announcements to facilitate the issue process. Before announcements, firms
strategically release good news to create an atmosphere favorable for conducting private
2

This kind of literature discusses why private placements are always offered at a discount and exhibit
positive abnormal returns around the announcement date.
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placements and continue releasing an even greater volume and ratio of good news
following the announcement. This phenomenon is more obvious if no insiders are
participating in the placements.
Unlike the research on SEOs (Lang and Lundholm 2000), our results show that
managers have no incentives to affect private placement pricing because private
placement itself has the function of reducing adverse selection. However, firms’
motivation to release information favorable to the issue of equity remains substantial.
Furthermore, as private placements with a strategic purpose provide issuers with great
opportunities to release good news, private placements can reduce the moral hazard
problems
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses Taiwan’s
regulatory environment and market characteristics. Section III reviews the relevant
literature on private placements and disclosure. Section IV details this paper’s research
methodology. Section V contains the study’s sample descriptions and empirical results.
Section VI discusses the results, and our conclusions are presented in Section VII.
II. Regulatory Environment and Market Characteristics in Taiwan
A. Taiwan’s Regulatory Environment for Private Placements
In Taiwan, the most essential regulations with respect to private placements are
covered by the Securities and Exchange Act (from Article 43-6 to Article 43-8). Such
regulations state that a public company may structure a private placement among
“accredited investors” only upon shareholder approval. Upon the date on which such
shareholders’ resolution has been passed, the private placement may be conducted in
installments within one year. Accredited investors refer to financial institutions (banks,
bills finance corporations, mutual funds and insurance companies, etc.), wealthy
investors (natural persons, legal persons, or funds meeting the specified entry
requirements), and insiders (directors, supervisors and executives of a company or its
affiliates). There are no limitations on the number of financial institutions, but the
number of other investors is limited to 35.
As for the pricing of private placements, no applicable regulations on the size of
discount have been available in Taiwan until 2005. However, starting from 2005, in
the case that the price of privately placed shares is lower than 80% of the reference
price,3 the offering company is required to seek and disclose an independent expert’s
3

The reference price refers to the highest of the average stock price for either the one, three, or five
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opinion on the reasonableness of the discount amount. Since 2010, the price of private
placements securities has been further restricted to 80% of the reference price in the
case that any insiders intend to participate in a private placement. In addition, there are
no restrictions on the amount of a private placement in Taiwan.
Upon the sale of privately placed shares, the offering company must disclose
relevant information as required in the Market Observation Post System (MOPS)
within 15 days. This disclosure comprises information on the number of shares offered,
the offering price, the purpose, and investors of the offering. In addition, there are
resale restrictions. In principle, investors are not allowed to resell privately placed
securities within three years. Should investors intend to transfer the securities in their
possession within three years, there will be certain restrictions applicable to the buyers
and the number of shares to be transferred. Upon expiration of the said three-year
holding period, if the company intends to register the privately placed shares, it is
required to file with the competent authority for retroactive process of public issuance
procedures.
B. Market Characteristics in Taiwan
Some of the market characteristics unique to Taiwan have made research on the
news management around private placement announcements very important. Unlike in
developed countries, where stock markets consist mainly of institutional investors, most
Taiwanese stock market participants are individual investors, who had almost 70% of
trading value in 2011. Taiwan’s stock markets are generally considered “shallow plate”
markets and are characterized by smaller firms, less transparency, high turnover rates,
high return volatility, high P/E ratios, and high systematic and liquidity risks.
According to Lin and Chang (2009), moreover, from 1998 to 2006, 57% of Taiwan’s
listed firms were family controlled.
Small businesses often consider higher fixed issuing costs a barrier to financing,
and their information asymmetry is more severe as well. Thus, private placements have
become vital ways for small firms to raise capital. Individual investors tend to be less
informed and less professionally experienced than institutional investors. They are also
more inclined to be influenced by news and thus to exhibit biases toward risk and
irrational investment decisions.

business days, or the average stock price for the thirty business days before the price determination date.
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III. Literature Review
Verrecchia (2001) suggests that information asymmetry reduction is an important
starting point for understanding the efficiency of disclosure choices and incentives. We
thus begin by exploring the relationships between information asymmetry and private
placements and the media.
A. Information Asymmetry and Private Placement
In the private placement literature, a key hypothesis on the factors behind firms’
choices of financing methods is the information hypothesis. Myers and Majluf (1984)
propose that, due to information asymmetries, overvalued firms prefer equity
financing. Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995), Spiess and Affleck-Graves
(1995) and Baker and Wurgler (2002) also suggest that firms can exploit windows of
opportunity (during which investors are overoptimistic about a firm’s prospects) to
issue equity, in what is known as the‘management-timing’ theory. Conversely, when
information asymmetry problems emerge, firms cannot be valued accurately.
Undervalued firms with valuable investment opportunities but insufficient capital tend
to refrain from issuing equity in the public market, leading to underinvestment (Myers
and Majluf 1984). Hertzel and Smith (1993) suggest that this type of underinvestment
problem could be mitigated if managers conveyed their private information to the
market.
Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) believe that like underwriters’ certification in
insured rights offerings, private placements also reduce adverse selection problems
(Eckbo and Masulis 1992; Myers and Majluf 1984). Firms prefer to disclose private
information to investors who have long-term interests in the firms. Furthermore, as the
equity-holding risk borne by private placement investors is higher than that held by
underwriters, the signal conveyed by the former is more reliable. Thus, firms with more
severe information asymmetry and undervaluation are more likely to choose private
placements to raise capital.
Aside from adverse selection problems, firms tend to prefer private placements to
public offerings when they are concerned about moral hazard costs (Cronqvist and
Nilsson 2005). Klein et al. (1978) point out that any party of firms cooperating on
investment projects may violate contracts out of self-interest. To avoid this kind of risk,
firms often enter into business relationships (e.g. product market agreements, joint
ventures, strategic alliances) with their block owners in order to reduce contracting and
monitoring costs—namely, moral hazard costs (Allen and Phillips 2000; Williamson
1979; Cronqvist and Nilsson 2005; Folta and Janney 2004). This is also an important
reason why firms choose private placements.
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These types of risk—adverse selection and moral hazard—may occur when
information asymmetry is present, and private placement is one of the countermeasures
managers can use to resolve them. Private equity shares are often offered to informed
investors in order to signal firms’ favorable qualities.
B. Information Asymmetry and Media
One of the media’s functions is to provide intelligence about our environment
(Lasswell 1949). Media present investors’ evaluations of firms while also shaping those
impressions by providing the information in either positive or negative terms (Golan
and Wanta 2001; Deephouse 2000; Pollock and Rindova 2003). Sources of media
information include company press releases, stakeholders, governments, specialized
rating agencies, and media workers (Deephouse 2000; Einwiller et al. 2010). The
media integrate and report the assessments offered by these information sources to
investors. Therefore, the media provide a counteracting mechanism that reduces
investors’ uncertainty about firms; the media mitigate information asymmetry in
capital markets by offering investors a consolidated source of information (Akerloff
1970; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Deephouse 2000).
Nevertheless, firms must also rely on the news media to convey information to
their investors, especially the kind of information that is not easily experienced or
inspected or that would lack credibility if conveyed by the firms themselves (Einwiller
et al. 2010). In Taiwan’s stock markets, individual investors account for about 70% of
all investors. Although firm managers use a variety of instruments to disclose
information about their firms, such as regulated financial reports, management
forecasts, conference calls, analysts’ presentations, and internet sites (Healy and Palepu
2001), news reports are individual investors’ primary information source about firms.
C. Private Placement and Media
Managers disclose information about their firms for two main reasons: to mitigate
information asymmetry and to hype their stock and thus reduce the cost of capital
(Coller and Yohn 1997; Lang and Lundholm 2000; Verrecchia 2001; Schrand and
Verrecchia 2005). Many studies find that equity issuers perform opportunistically. For
example, Ho et al. (2010) find that insiders conduct news management to hype the
stock prices of IPO firms before the offering and gradually sell off their stakes
afterwards. Pollock and Rindova (2003) find that the level of media-provided
information is negatively associated with IPO underpricing and positively related to
first-day trading turnover. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that issuers increase their
corporate disclosure activities during the six-month period before SEOs and show that
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the disclosure goal is not only to reduce information asymmetry but also to hype their
stock.
Similar kinds of manipulation have been found in private placement events. He et
al. (2011), studying the earnings management of U.S. firms conducting private
placements between 1989 and 2001, find that private placement issuers appear to
inflate reported earnings in the year preceding the issue to present a blueprint of their
prospects. Because investors are not likely to recognize such income-increasing
manipulation, the issuers gain direct monetary benefits by placing equity privately with
more favorable terms.
Although both private placements and the media provide a mechanism for
reducing information asymmetry, Hoffman and Ocasio (2001) suggest that firms must
strategically manage the media because they can influence public perception. The
foregoing insights lead us to pose three interesting research questions:
(i) Do managers conduct news management around private placement
announcements?
(ii) When insiders (managers) participate in private placements, do they change their
disclosure activities for self-interested incentives?
(iii) Whether information asymmetries are reduced around private placements through
news management?
IV. Sample Selection and Research Methodology
A. Sample Selection
Since we are interested in understanding how firms strategically manage news, our
focus is on news reports around private placements. First, we choose equity private
placements announced between January 2006 and December 2010 by firms listed on
the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) and the Gre-Tai Securities Market (OTC). Then
we collect news reports around the announcement for each private placement. Data
about the characteristics of the private placements were collected from companies’
annual reports and Taiwan’s Market Observation Post System. Directorship, financial,
and return data were obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal database. We
excluded private placements left incomplete after an announcement or conducted by
financial firms, and deleted observations with incomplete data. News reports were
obtained from the InfoWinner Plus database.
Our literature review indicates that managers have two incentives to manage news.
Managers may disclose good news preceding a private placement announcement in
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order to issue shares at relatively high prices. For example, Lang and Lundholm (2000)
suggest that firms change disclosure policies to increase the proceeds from SEOs.
Managers may also release good news to ensure the placements’ success following the
announcement. We analyze news published within a 30-day window preceding the
private placement announcement; this is the ‘pre-announcement sample’. We also
analyze news published within a 30-day window following the announcement; this is
the ‘post-announcement sample’. The total sample consists of 322 private placements,
including 709 news reports in the pre-announcement sample and 910 news reports in
the post-announcement sample.
B. Research Methodology
In this study, we employ logistic regressions and ordinary least squares (OLS) to
analyze the determinants of the valence and tenor of the media coverage.
(a) Dependent Variables
Two sets of measures, the valence and tenor of the media coverage, serve as
dependent variables. The first set includes SRET and GN, and it is used for insider
trading by Noe (1999) and Cheng and Lo (2006) and for repurchasing shares by
Brockman et al. (2008). The two measures reflect the valence of the media coverage
from the market’s point of view. The second set consists of TENOR, used for media
reputation by Deephouse (2000) and for initial public offerings (IPOs) by Pollock and
Rindova (2003) and Jang (2007). This measure reflects the tenor of media coverage
from the media readers’ point of view.
The first two dependent variables, SRET and GN, are continuous and dummy
variables, respectively. If the three-day abnormal return (SRET) around a news report is
positive (negative), the news is classified as good news (bad news), and GN is equal to 1
(0). The three-day abnormal returns reflect the information content of news reports,
which are calculated in the market-adjusted return model as the excess returns over the
value-weighted stock index in the three-day window [-1, 1] around news reports.
The third dependent variable, TENOR, is a continuous variable. We employ the
Janis-Fadner coefficient of imbalance (Deephouse 2000; Janis and Fadner 1965;
Pollock and Rindova 2003) as a proxy to calculate each sample firm’s media coverage
tenor. The formula is as follows:
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( P 2 − PN ) / V 2 , if P > N ;
TENOR =

0,

if P = N ;
2

2

( PN − N ) / V , if P < N ,
where P is the number of positive articles, N is the number of negative articles, and V is
the total number of articles within 30-day periods before and after the private
placement announcement. The coefficient occurs between -1 and +1, where +1
represents all good news, and -1, all bad news.
To measure the tenor of media coverage (TENOR), we collect and conduct a
content analysis on 1,619 news reports available in the InfoWinner Plus database,
which covers public disclosures in popular newspapers and on the Internet. As in prior
research (Deephouse 2000; Pollock and Rindova 2003), each article is coded as
positive, negative, or neutral. A positive (negative) article implies that the tone of the
statement is considered favorable (unfavorable) for stock prices, and we define this as
good (bad) news. A neutral article means that the tone of the statement is considered to
have almost no impact on stock prices or is equally positive and negative. If multiple
pieces of news about the same firm are published on the same day, we keep only the
most extensive version of the reports because these multiple reports are usually
generated from the same underlying disclosure. Of these, 709 articles come from the
pre-announcement period and 910 from the post-announcement period.
Thus, GN represents the relative ratio (or frequency) of good to bad news,
whereas SRET and TENOR reflect the magnitude of the news.
(b) Independent Variables
The independent variables are based on prior research on information disclosure
and private placements. These variables cover three dimensions: firm characteristics,
private placement characteristics, and measures of discretionary disclosure.
a) Measures of firm Characteristics
Firm characteristics expected to influence the valence and tenor of media coverage
include firm size, market-to-book ratio, return on equity (ROE), financial conditions,
and the momentum effect. Firm size (LnMKT) denotes the natural logarithm of market
value by the end of the fiscal year before the date of the private placement
announcement. In general, information about large firms is easier to collect than that
about small firms; thus, information asymmetry is relatively high in small firms.
Studies suggest that firm size is positively related to management earnings forecasts for
repurchasing shares (Brockman et al. 2008) and stock-based incentives (Nagar et al.
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2003). We assume that small firms will release a greater ratio of good news to enhance
their popularity around private placement announcement. Market-to-book ratio (MB)
is defined as the ratio of market value to book value of equity by the end of the fiscal
year prior to the announcement date (Folta and Janney 2004). A firm with higher MB
reflects higher growth opportunities but is relatively difficult to evaluate. In a firm with
higher MB, a greater proportion of its value consists of intangible assets, while a lower
MB implies a greater proportion of tangible assets. Information asymmetry is more
severe in firms whose intangible assets are worth more. This kind of firm is thus more
likely to be undervalued (Hertzel and Smith 1993; Tan et al. 2002). Therefore, we
assume that firms with higher MB will tend to release a greater ratio of good news to
enhance the public perception of the firms’ growth prospects.
We employ two variables, ROE and Distress, to capture firm performance. Here,
ROE denotes return on equity in the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. The
literature shows that firms’ disclosures increase with firm performance (Lang and
Lundholm 1993). Furthermore, Distress is a dummy variable, defined as 1 if a firm
suffers two consecutive years of negative earnings before the announcement date or
faces a threat to its operations (e.g. bankruptcy or restructuring), and 0 otherwise.
Because a private placement is often the only feasible financing channel for firms in
financial distress (Krishnamurthy et al. 2005), managers of such firms should try to
attract investors who can help them overcome their financial problems; we assume that
financially distressed firms tend to release a greater ratio of good news in order to do
this. Finally, the variable ABRET is used to control for the momentum effect, which
denotes cumulative abnormal returns over the period beginning 90 days and ending
two days before the private placement announcement.
b) Measures of Private Placement Characteristics
The variables for the characteristics of private placements include offering size,
offering purpose, managerial participation, ownership concentration, and changes in
ownership concentration. Offering size (LnProceeds) denotes the natural logarithm of
the total proceeds issued in the private placement and displays messages about offering
quality and stability to investors (Pollock and Rindova 2003). Purpose is a dummy
variable. If the funds are to be used for financial purposes, Purpose is equal to 1; if the
use is strategic, Purpose is equal to 0. A financial purpose is either working capital or
debt reduction, and a strategic purpose is either the introduction of strategic investors
or ensuring the rights of business control. Since firms often develop a cooperative
relationship with investors through private placements (Cronqvist and Nilsson 2005;
Janney and Folta 2003), private placements with a strategic purpose convey a more
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positive signal about the firms.
Three variables are relevant to firm insiders and ownership concentration. The
variable Managers is equal to 1 if a director, supervisor, or senior management is among
the buyer(s) of a private placement, and 0 otherwise. For the information hypothesis,
an increase in managerial holdings is a positive signal. Because managers know more
about firm value, their participation in private placements signals firm undervaluation.
However, under some circumstances, placements to managers will convey less positive
information, as, for example, when managers engage in self-dealing or are
overoptimistic about a firm’s outlook, which could harm the interests of
non-participating shareholders (Hertzel & Smith 1993; Heaton 2002; Malmendier and
Tate 2005; Wong and Zhang 2009; Wruck and Wu 2009).
In the private placement literature, Nagar et al. (2003) propose that, because
equity ownership offers managers incentives to disseminate information to investors,
managers’ disclosure activities increase with insider ownership. Brockman et al. (2008)
find that managerial incentives to change the flow of information are positively related
to managerial holdings in a firm. For example, when the level of equity-based
compensation granted to managers increases, managers are more likely to release bad
news before a share repurchase to buy back stocks at lower prices (Barclay and Smith Jr
1988). Moreover, Wruck (1989) suggests that increases in ownership concentration in
private placements convey positive signals to the market about improvements to the
monitoring mechanism. Thus, we define ownership concentration (Ownership) as the
percentage of shares held by the managers and block holders with 5% or greater
ownership. ΔOwnership is defined as the change in ownership concentration before
and after the private placement announcement.
c) Measures of Discretionary Disclosure
To examine issuers’ discretionary disclosure behavior, we employ the dummy
variable Discretion, set at 1 if a news report mentions additional detail or a managerial
quote about an offering firm and 0 otherwise. Lang and Lundholm (2000) find that
managers tend to release more news with additional detail or managerial quotations
before SEOs to facilitate the issues. We thus assume that any news containing these
detailed statements has likely been voluntarily released by the issuer. To conduct the
TENOR regression, we use the variable DiscretionRatio, the ratio of discretionary news
for each private placement.
(c) Models of Analysis
Using the above variables, we test the effects of firm characteristics, private
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placement characteristics, and discretionary disclosure on the valence and tenor of
media coverage. Our models are as described below.

SRET = β 0 + β 1 LnMKT + β 2 MB + β 3 ROE + β 4 Distress + β 5 ABRET
+ β 6 Ln Pr oceeds + β 7 Purpose + β 8 Managers

(1)

+ β 9 Ownership + β 10 ΔOwnership + β 11 Discretion
Pr (GN) = β 0 + β 1 LnMKT + β 2 MB + β 3 ROE + β 4 Distress + β 5 ABRET
+ β 6 Ln Pr oceeds + β 7 Purpose + β 8 Managers

(2)

+ β 9 Ownership + β 10 ΔOwnership + β 11 Discretion

TENOR = β 0 + β 1 LnMKT + β 2 MB + β 3 ROE + β 4 Distress + β 5 ABRET
+ β 6 Ln Pr oceeds + β 7 Purpose + β 8 Managers

(3)

+ β 9 Ownership + β 10 ΔOwnership + β 11 DiscretionRatio
V. Empirical Analysis
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all variables used for our samples. Since
we use two different measurement perspectives for the information content, we show
both results in panels A and B. Panel A reports the descriptive statistics of the sample
from the market view (SRET/GN), the observations for which are collected on the date
the news was published. Panel B reports statistics from the media readers’ view
(TENOR), the observations for which are obtained on the private placement date.
Because the results are similar and as the results in Panel B are more realistic in
reflecting the characteristics of the offering firms and private placements, we discuss
only the results in Panel B. For the pre-announcement sample in Panel B, we start with
the characteristics of the offering firms. The sample firms’ average market value is
NT$4.99 billion.4 Their average market-to-book ratio is 1.685. Their average return
on equity (ROE) is -39.6%. Moreover, 43.5% of the firms are under financial distress.
The momentum effect (ABRET) is -0.022.

4

NT$ denotes New Taiwan Dollar. US$1 was around NT$30 in November 2012.
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We then focus on the characteristics of the private placements. The average
proceeds issued in the private placements of our sample is NT$549 million. In
addition, 83.9% of private placement proceeds are raised for financial purposes.
Managers and block holders possess an average of 42.6% of shares before private
placements, and the average change in total percentage holdings is 2.4%. Moreover,
67.7% of private placements involve manager participation, and 15.9% of news reports
provide additional detail or managerial quotations about the sample firms.
For the post-announcement sample in Panel B, the statistics are the same as those
for the pre-announcement sample, except for the tenor of media coverage. We discuss
our main concern, the results on the valence and tenor of media coverage, in Panels A
and B together. For the pre-announcement sample, the average abnormal return (SRET)
around news reports is 0.4%. The average GN is 54.4%, indicating that more than half
of news reports are good. The average tenor of the media coverage (TENOR) is 0.137,
similar to the result for GN, reflecting a greater ratio of good news. Moreover, the
average volume of media coverage (VOLUME)5 is 2.199. For the post-announcement
sample, the average SRET, GN, TENOR, and VOLUME are 0.9%, 60.5%, 0.202, and
2.826, respectively. The evidence thus shows that firms

5

For ease of interpretation, we use the volume of media coverage (VOLUME) to assess the disclosure
frequency of news reports, denoting the total number of articles published in popular newspapers and on
the Internet within 30-day periods before and after the announcement date.
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able 1. Summary Statistics

Freq.

Pre-announcement Sample
Std.
Mean
Min. Median
Dev.

Max.

Post-announcement Sample
Std.
Media
Freq. Mean
Min.
Dev.
n

Max.

Panel A: Market’s Views
SRET

709

0.004

0.022 -0.093

0.002

0.095

910

0.009

0.026 -0.089

Good news

386

0.019

0.017

0.013

0.095

551

0.023

0.020

Bad news

323

359

-0.014

910

0.605

0.000

GN

709

MKT (NTD mil)

709

MB

709

ROE

709

Distress
ABRET

709
709

-0.01
0.013 -0.093 -0.010
0.000
3
0.544 0.498 0.000 1.000
1.000
18,42
47,649
73 3,081 248,915
4
1.815 1.774 0.180 1.250 11.550
-0.25
0.787 -6.527 0.004
0.874
7
0.298 0.458 0.000 0.000
1.000
0.014 0.377 -1.632 0.013
1.149

Proceeds (NTD mil)

709

1,992

4,059

306

Purpose
Managers
Ownership
△Ownership
Discretion

709
709
709
709
709

0.702
0.657
0.385
0.020
0.303

0.458 0.000 1.000
0.475 0.000 1.000
0.162 0.099 0.386
0.083 -0.307 -0.003
0.460 0.000 0.000

1

910

0.000

0.000

10,839 29,008

73

1.762

910

-0.295

910
910

22,278
1.000
1.000
0.993
0.576
1.000

0.018

0.095
0.095

0.015 -0.089 -0.009 - 0.000
0.489

910

0.004

1.755

0.180

1.000

1.000
248,91
2,395
5
1.220 11.550

0.827 -6.527 -0.017

0.874

0.332
0.021

0.471 0.000
0.377 -1.632

1.000
1.149

910

1,553

3,382

910
910
910
910
910

0.677
0.596
0.394
0.024
0.389

0.468 0.000 1.000
0.491 0.000 1.000
0.159 0.099 0.386
0.098 -0.437 -0.001
0.488 0.000 0.000

1

0.000
0.016
299

22,278
1.000
1.000
0.828
0.576
1.000
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Table 1. Summary Statistics (continued)
Pre-announcement Sample
Freq. Mean
Std. Min. Median
Dev.
Panel B: Media Readers’ Views

Max.

Post-announcement Sample
Freq. Mean Std. Min. Media Max.
Dev.
n

TENOR

322

0.137

0.771 -1.000

0.000

1.000

322

0.202

VOLUME

322

2.199

3.208

1.000

25.000

322

2.826

MKT (NTD mil)

322

4,990

MB

322

1.685

ROE

322

-0.396

Distress

322

0.435

ABRET
Proceeds (NTD mil)

322
322

-0.022
549

Purpose

322

0.839

Managers

322

0.677

Ownership

322

0.426

△Ownership

322

0.024

DiscretionRatio

322

0.159

21,053

0.000
73

906 248,915

0.180 1.180
1.687
0.917 -6.527 -0.105

11.550

0.000 0.000
0.497
0.389 -1.632 -0.016
1,913
1
133

1.000
1.149
22,278

0.000

1.000

1.000

0.000

1.000

1.000

0.099

0.412

0.993

-0.437

0.002

0.576

0.000

0.000

1.000

0.369
0.468
0.176
0.104
0.281

-1.00
0.240 1.000
0
34.00
3.541 0.000 2.000
0
0.681

0.874

322 0.268

0.336 0.000 0.000 1.000

This table presents summary statistics of all variables used for our samples. The pre-announcement sample refers to a
30-day event window preceding the private placement announcement; the post-announcement sample refers to a
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30-day event window following the announcement. Panel A reports descriptive statistics from the market’s views.
SRET is the 3-day abnormal return around news reports. GN is equal to one (zero) if SRET is positive (negative), and
the news is classified as good news (bad news). Panel B reports descriptive statistics from the media readers’ views.
TENOR is the tenor of media coverage. VOLUME is the total number of articles published in popular newspapers and
on the Internet within 30-day periods before or after the announcement date. Variables used in both panels include:
MKT is the market value by the end of the fiscal year before the private placement announcement date. MB is the ratio
of market value to book value of equity by the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. ROE is return on
equity in the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. Distress is defined as 1 if a firm suffers two consecutive years of
negative earnings before the announcement date or faces a threat to its operations, and 0 otherwise. ABRET is the
cumulative abnormal returns over the period beginning 90 days and ending 2 days before the announcement date.
Proceeds is the total proceeds issued in the private placement. Purpose is equal to 1 if the funds are to be used for
financial purposes; if the use is strategic, Purpose is equal to 0. Managers is equal to 1 if a director, supervisor or senior
management is among the buyer(s) of a private placement, and 0 otherwise. Ownership is the percentage of shares held
by the managers and block holders with 5% or greater ownership. ΔOwnership is the change in ownership concentration
before and after the private placement announcement. Discretion set at 1 if a news report mentions additional detail or
a managerial quote, and 0 otherwise. DiscretionRatio is the ratio of discretionary news for each private placement.
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tend to have a larger ratio of good news and a larger volume of media coverage after the
announcement than before it.
B. Further Analysis of the Valence, Tenor, and Volume of Media Coverage
Panel A of Table 2 shows that the average abnormal returns (SRET) around news
reports during the pre- and post-announcement periods are 0.4% and 0.9%,
respectively, and that the difference between them is statistically significant at the 0.01
level. In Panel B of Table 2, we conduct a Chi-square test of difference to look for
differences in news valence between the pre- and post-announcement periods. The
results show that the frequency of good news is greater for news published after private
placement announcements than it is for news published before (61% versus 54%,
respectively).
Panel C of Table 2 reports the tenor (TENOR) and volume (VOLUME) of media
coverage around private placement announcements. The average TENOR is 0.137 and
0.202 for the pre- and post-announcement samples, respectively. Although they are
both statistically significantly different from zero at the 0.01 level, the difference
between the two average TENORs of the pre- and post-announcement samples is
statistically insignificant. The average volume of media coverage is 2.199 and 2.826 for
the pre- and post-announcement sample, respectively, for a statistically significant
difference at the 0.05 level.
Taken together, the results show that the magnitude and frequency of good news
during the post-announcement period are greater than those during the
pre-announcement period.
C. Analysis of News Categories around Private Placement Announcements
(a) Techniques of News Management
Since the magnitude and frequency of good news after private placement
announcements are greater, what is the source of these news reports? As the literature
suggests that managers have incentives to skilfully change the content of information
flows (Lang and Lundholm 2000; Brockman et al. 2008; Ho et al. 2010), we examine
the characteristics of news reports to investigate whether strategic managerial behavior
occurs in private placements. Following the approach in Ho et al. (2010), we classify
news reports into six categories: 1) Sales/Financials, 2) Industry/R&D, 3)
Strategy/Policy, 4) Financing, 5) Regulation/Law, and 6) Others. Panel A of Table 3
reports the frequency of news reports and the tenor of media coverage across different
categories over the announcement periods.
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Table 2. Valence, Tenor and Volume of Media Coverage during Pre- and
Post-announcement Periods
Panel A: Abnormal Returns around News Reports during Pre- and
Post-announcement Periods

Pre-announcement period (1)
Post-announcement period (2)
Diff (2-1)

N
709
910

SRET
Mean
0.004

t-statistic
4.835***

0.009
0.005

9.943***
3.700***

Panel B: Chi-Square Test of Difference between News Valence and Period Type
Good
news
386
(54%)
551
(61%)
937

Pre-announcement period
Post-announcement period
Total
Chi-square test of difference

Bad news

Total

323
(46%)
359
(39%)
682

709
910
1619

6.095**

Panel C: Tenor and Volume of Media Coverage during Pre- and
Post-announcement Periods
N
322

Pre-announcement period
(1)
Post-announcement period 322
(2)
Diff (2-1)

TENOR
Mean t-statistic
0.137
3.185***

N
322

VOLUME
Mean
t-statistic
2.199 12.299***

0.202

5.324***

322

2.826

14.323***

0.065

1.139

0.627

2.356**

The table reports the valence, tenor and volume of media coverage during pre- and
post-announcement periods. The pre-announcement period refers to 30 days preceding
the private placement announcement; the post-announcement period refers to 30 days
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following the announcement. Panel A reports the change in SRET between the pre- and
post-announcement periods. SRET is the 3-day abnormal return around news reports.
Panel B reports Chi-square test of difference between news valence and period type. A
piece of news is classified as good (bad) news if SRET is positive (negative). Panel C
reports changes in the tenor and volume of media coverage between the pre- and
post-announcement periods. TENOR is the tenor of media coverage. VOLUME is the
total number of articles published in popular newspapers and on the Internet within
30-day periods before or after the announcement date. *** and ** indicate significance
at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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Table 3. Changes in Frequency of News Reports and the Tenor of Media Coverage
across News Categories
Panel A: Frequency of News Reports and the Tenor of Media Coverage across
News Categories
Good
Neutral
Bad News All News
News
News
N Fre
N Freq. N Freq.
N Freq.
Sales/Financials
q.
Pre-announcem 145 228
27 30 117 132 253 390
Post-announce
137 196
27 33 125 133 249 362
ent
Industry/R&D
ment
Pre-announcem 30 58
7
9
2
3
33 70
Post-announce
32 70
13 18
3
4
37 92
ent
Strategy/Policy
ment
Pre-announcem 42 64
14 20
5
5
50 89
Post-announce
71 141
12 14
4
5
76 160
ent
Financing
ment
Pre-announcem 21 29
28 38
5
5
47 72
Post-announce
80 127
85 100
5
5
140 232
ent
Regulation/law
ment
Pre-announcem 3
5
2
2
5
7
10 14
Post-announce
1
1
2
2
5
5
7
8
ent
Others
ment
Pre-announcem 22 29
22 42
3
3
38 74
Post-announce
13
13
25
40
3
3
37 56
ent
ment
Panel B: Changes in The Tenor of Media Coverage (TENOR)
Post-announcement Periods
Category

Category
Sales/Financial
s
Industry/R&
D
Strategy/Polic
y
Financing

N
293
54
108
155

Tenor of Media
Coverage
TENO t-stat.
R
0.144 1.856*
0.094 0.663
0.651
0.546

-0.071
-0.313

7.379**
6.593**
*
*
6.951**
12.915*
*
**
3.316**
9.663**
*
*
-0.695
-1.504

0.138
0.041

4.099**
1.904*
*

0.477
0.749
0.134
0.288

between Pre- and

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min.

Median

Max.

t-stat.

-0.061

0.898

-2.000

0.000

2.000

-0.856

-0.043

0.770

-1.000

0.000

1.000

-0.445

0.271

0.828

-1.000

0.653

1.250

0.278

0.577

-1.250

0.000

2.000

4.134***

The Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance • Volume 19, No. 1 • Spring 2017

57

5.895***
Regulation/la
15
-0.083 0.864
-1.000 0.000
1.000
-0.347
w
Others
62
-0.127 0.579
-1.000 0.000
1.000
-1.612
This table reports changes in frequency of news reports and the tenor of media coverage
across news categories. Panel A reports the frequency of news reports and the tenor of
media coverage. N is the number of private placements. Good (bad) news implies that
the tone of news is considered to be favorable (unfavorable) for stock price of private
placement firms. TENOR is the tenor of media coverage. The pre-announcement
period refers to 30 days preceding the private placement announcement; the
post-announcement period refers to 30 days following the announcement. Panel B
reports changes in the tenor of media coverage (TENOR) between pre- and
post-announcement periods. *** and * indicate significance at the 1% and 10% level,
respectively.
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During the pre-announcement period, the highest reporting frequency appears in
the Sales/Financials category, with 390 pieces of news, followed by the Strategy/Policy
category, with 89 news reports. The Financing category has 72 news reports, followed
by the Industry/R&D category’s 70 pieces; the lowest frequency of news is in the
Regulation/Law category (with 14 pieces). During the post-announcement period, the
Sales/Financials category still has the highest reporting frequency, followed by the
Financing category, with the largest increase in frequency (totalling 232 news reports).
The category with the second-largest increase in the number of news reports is the
Strategy/Policy category, with 160 news reports. Most of the frequency increases are in
good news. The news reports in other categories experience either a small increase or
decrease.
The large increases in news frequency in the Strategy/Policy and Financing
categories over the announcement periods imply the possibility of news management
on the part of private placement firms. Ho et al. (2010) suggest that news in the
Strategy/Policy category offers managers the opportunity to bias media coverage
because it is easy to do by offering only a blueprint of a firm’s future outlook.
Therefore, the voluntary release of news in this category is the most frequently used
method by which offering firms seek to improve investors’ evaluation of the firms’
future. News in the Financing category provides further opportunities for managers to
engage in news management by emphasizing the benefits of the offerings or the
possibility/success of introducing strategic investors. News in the other categories is
more difficult to create, however, thus the lack of large volume increases for these types
of news.
In Panel A of Table 3, the tenor of media coverage (TENOR) is significantly
positive in all but the Regulation/Law category during both pre- and
post-announcement periods, indicating that offering firms have a greater ratio of good
news in most news categories. For the pre-announcement sample, the two categories
with the largest TENOR are the Industry/R&D category (0.651) and the
Strategy/Policy category (0.477). For the post-announcement sample, the
Strategy/Policy category has the largest TENOR (0.749), followed by the
Industry/R&D category, with 0.546 of TENOR. However, the ratio of good news
declines in the Industry/R&D category and other news categories, except the Financing
category, which has the second-largest increase in the ratio of good news, with 0.288 of
TENOR. By contrast, the ratio of good news is relatively small in the Regulation/Law
category, with -0.071 and -0.313 of TENOR before and after the announcement,
respectively. This result is consistent with Ho et al. (2010), as this kind of news often
refers to violations of regulations or laws.
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We also examine the changes in the tenor of media coverage (TENOR) between
the pre- and post-announcement periods. Panel B of Table 3 shows that the
Strategy/Policy and Financing categories experience an increased ratio of good news
after the announcements and that the increase is statistically significant at the 1% level.
These results provide further support for the argument that offering firms prefer to
release the two categories of news to bias media coverage.
(b) Another Technique of News Management
Aside from releasing news in the Strategy/Policy and Financing categories, issuers
also engage in news management by releasing more forward-looking news. Ho et al.
(2010) find that equity issuing firms tend to disclose more forward-looking news when
anticipating positive prospects. To examine this argument, we divide the news into
forward-looking and historical reports. If a piece of news is related to the future (past),
it is classified as a forward-looking (historical) report. If it contains both
forward-looking and historical statements, it is a neutral report. Table 4 presents the
summary statistics. During the pre-announcement period, about 41.89% of good news
reports are forward-looking while only 5.16% of bad news reports refer to the future.
During the post-announcement period, the ratio of forward-looking reports increases
to 52.19% in the good news category, while the ratio declines to 5.81% in the bad
news category. These results reveal that offering firms seem to disclose their prospects
by releasing more forward-looking good news, especially during the
post-announcement period. The significant difference between good and bad news
categories in the ratio of forward-looking reports also implies that private placement
firms tend to disclose forward-looking news when the firms’ prospects are positive but
delay releasing the negative news.

Table 4. Summary Statistics of Forward-looking and Historical News Reports

Pre-announceme
nt
Post-announceme
nt

Good News

Bad News

Ratio of
Forward- Historica
Forward-Looki
Looking
l
ng

Ratio of
Forward- Historic
Forward-Looki
Looking
al
ng

173

226

41.89%

8

143

5.16%

286

250

52.19%

9

146

5.81%

This table reports the frequency of forward-looking and historical news reports. The
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pre-announcement period refers to 30 days preceding the private placement
announcement; the post-announcement period refers to 30 days following the
announcement. Good (bad) news implies that the tone of news is considered to be
favorable (unfavorable) for stock price of private placement firms. Forward-looking
(historical) news means that a piece of news is related to the future (past). Ratio of
forward-looking news = the number of forward-looking news reports/ the total number
of forward-looking and historical news reports.
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D. Discretionary News Releasing
To examine whether issuers adjust their disclosure activities around private
placement announcements, we distinguish between discretional and non-discretional
news report statements. Panel A of Table 5 reports the chi-square test of difference
showing whether discretionary behavior differs between pre- and post-announcement
periods. The proportion of Discretion is 39% for the post-announcement sample,
significantly larger than that (30%) for the pre-announcement sample, indicating that
the frequency of news reports voluntarily released is substantially higher during the
post-announcement period. We further examine the association between the good/bad
news type and the discretion in the released news. In Panel B of Table 5, the
proportions of discretional statements in the good and bad news reports differ
insignificantly during the pre-announcement period. However, about 42% of good
news is voluntarily released by the private placement issuers following the
announcement, while only 34% of bad news is voluntarily disclosed, a difference
statistically significant at the 1% level. These results mean that the substantially large
increase in the number of good news reports during the post-announcement period is
strongly attributable to the voluntary disclosure behavior of the issuers. Thus, private
placement firms engage in news management to achieve their fund-raising goals.
E. Regression Analysis
This section examines the impacts of the firm and private placement
characteristics and of discretionary disclosure on the valence and tenor of media
coverage around the private placement announcement. The valence and tenor of media
coverage are used as the dependent variables in the regression analysis and will be
discussed accordingly.
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Table 5. Discretionary Disclosure around Private Placement Announcements
Panel A: Chi-Square Test of Difference between Discretion Type and Period Type
Discretion
Pre-announcement
Post-announcement
Total

Non-discretion

Total
709

215

494

(30%)

(70%)

354

556

(39%)

(61%)

569

Chi-square test of difference

910

1050

1619

12.861***

Panel B: Chi-Square Test of Difference between Discretion Type and News Type
during Pre- and Post-announcement Periods
Pre-announcement
Discretion
Good news
Bad news
Total
Chi-square test of
difference

Post-announcement

Non-discretion Total

113

273

(29%)

(71%)

102

221

(32%)

(68%)

215

494
0.442

386
323
709

Discretion Non-discretion Total
233

318

(42%)

(58%)

121

238

(34%)

(66%)

354

556

551
359
910

6.736***

The table reports discretionary disclosure around private placement announcement.
The pre-announcement period refers to 30 days preceding the private placement
announcement; the post-announcement period refers to 30 days following the
announcement. Panel A reports Chi-square test of difference between discretion type
and period type. A piece of news is classified as discretion news if it refers to additional
detail or managerial quote about an offering firm and non-discretion otherwise. Panel
B reports Chi-square test of difference between discretion type and news type during
pre- and post-announcement periods. Good (bad) news implies that the tone of news is
considered to be favorable (unfavorable) for stock price of private placement firms. ***
indicates significance at the 1% level.
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(a) SRET as Dependent Variable
Model 1 of Table 6 presents the OLS regression results based on equation (1).
The coefficient of firm size (LnMKT) is significantly negative for the
pre-announcement sample, suggesting that small firms tend to have a greater ratio of
good news. The coefficient of market-to-book ratio (MB) is statistically positive at the
5% level for the pre-announcement sample, indicating that firms with high growth
opportunities tend to have a greater ratio of good news. The coefficient of ABRET is
significantly positive for the pre-announcement sample, corroborating the operation of
the momentum effect by which investors keep earning positive abnormal returns
around news reports following a period of good stock; it also implies that, when
releasing news around the announcement date, firms that enjoy good stock
performance in one period will get favorable responses. The coefficient of changes in
ownership concentration (△Ownership) is statistically negative at the 10% level for the
pre-announcement sample, indicating that, when the percentage of participating
insiders decreases in private placements, firms tend to have a smaller ratio of good news.
However, the results concerning changes in ownership concentration in Model 1 are
inconsistent with the argument in Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) about firm quality
certification,6 suggesting the possibility of managerial news management, which will be
discussed in Section VI.
The coefficient of proceeds raised (LnProceeds) is significantly positive at the 10%
level for the post-announcement sample. Large issue proceeds suggest the availability of
investment opportunities and will reduce the degree of information asymmetry by
prompting more investors to assess a firm; thus, the raising of large proceeds is
associated with more positive information. On the other hand, managers of offering
firms may have incentives to release good news to facilitate raising large proceeds.
Additionally, the coefficient of Discretion is statistically significant at the 1% level only
for the post-announcement sample, supporting the view that managers tend to
6

Krishnamurthy et al. (2005) suggest that affiliated investor participation in private placements is a
certification of firm quality because affiliated investors have lower information costs and know more
about firm value.
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voluntarily release good news following the announcements.
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Table 6. Regression Results
Model 1: SRET
Pre-announcement
Intercept
LnMKT
MB
ROE
Distress
ABRET
LnProceeds
Purpose
Managers
Ownership
△Ownership
Discretion
DiscretionRatio

0.009
(0.052)*
-0.002
(0.008)***
0.001
(0.033)**
-0.002
(0.312)
-0.004
(0.143)
0.019
(0.000)***
0.001
(0.195)
0.000
(0.891)
-0.000
(0.838)
0.007
(0.281)
-0.019
(0.085)*
0.003
(0.172)

Post-announcemen
t
0.024
(0.000)***
- 0.003
(0.000)***
0.000
(0.636)
0.001
(0.450)
-0.001
(0.760)
- 0.003
(0.323)
0.001
(0.051)*
-0.000
(0.806)
-0.002
(0.190)
0.003
(0.680)
-0.012
(0.291)
0.007
(0.000)***

Model 2: GN
Pre-announcement
0.270
(0.604)
-0.066
(0.345)
0.045
(0.368)
-0.135
(0.298)
-0.210
(0.356)
1.536
(0.000)***
0.071
(0.267)
0.055
(0.760)
-0.036
(0.837)
0.043
(0.940)
-2.014
(0.075)*
-0.110
(0.551)

Model 3: TENOR

Post-announceme
nt
2.262
(0.000)***
-0.236
(0.001)***
0.005
(0.901)
0.097
(0.364)
-0.213
(0.254)
-0.366
(0.090)*
0.081
(0.198)
-0.434
(0.010)***
-0.212
(0.181)
-0.184
(0.726)
-0.220
(0.772)
0.401
(0.006)***

Pre-announcement Post-announcement
-0.646
(0.050)**
0.027
(0.552)
0.054
(0.032) **
0.023
(0.715)
-0.062
(0.547)
0.293
(0.010)**
0.068
(0.070)*
0.042
(0.673)
0.079
(0.398)
0.124
(0.668)
-0.003
(0.995)

0.405

-0.230
(0.356)
-0.020
(0.525)
0.033
(0.053)*
-0.047
(0.276)
-0.105
(0.231)
0.155
(0.144)
0.117
(0.000)***
-0.117
(0.150)
-0.073
(0.345)
0.046
(0.842)
-0.899
(0.016)**

0.407
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(0.006)***
N
Adjusted
Concordant
R-squared

(0.000)***

709

910

709

910

322

322

0.107

0.025

0.033

0.009

0.089

0.151

62%

62%

pairs
This table reports the regression results of valence (SRET and GN) and tenor (TENOR) of media coverage on firm characteristics, private
placement characteristics and variables about discretionary disclosure. The pre-announcement period refers to 30 days preceding the private
placement announcement; the post-announcement period refers to 30 days following the announcement. SRET is the 3-day abnormal return
around news reports. GN is equal to one (zero) if SRET is positive (negative). TENOR is the overall tenor of media coverage. LnMKT is the
natural logarithm of market value by the end of the fiscal year before the private placement announcement date. MB is the ratio of market
value to book value of equity by the end of the fiscal year prior to the announcement date. ROE is return on equity in the fiscal year prior to
the announcement date. Distress is defined as 1 if a firm suffers two consecutive years of negative earnings before the announcement date or
faces a threat to its operations, and 0 otherwise. ABRET is the cumulative abnormal returns over the period beginning 90 days and ending 2
days before the announcement date. LnProceeds is the natural logarithm of the total proceeds issued in the private placement. Purpose is equal
to 1 if the funds are to be used for financial purposes; if the use is strategic, Purpose is equal to 0. Managers is equal to 1 if a director, supervisor
or senior management is among the buyer(s) of a private placement, and 0 otherwise. Ownership is the percentage of shares held by the
managers and block holders with 5% or greater ownership. ΔOwnership is the change in ownership concentration before and after the private
placement announcement. Discretion set at 1 if a news report mentions additional detail or a managerial quote, and 0 otherwise.
DiscretionRatio is the ratio of discretionary news for each private placement.
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(b) GN as Dependent Variable
Model 2 of Table 6 presents the logistic regression results based on equation (2).
The coefficients of the statistically significant variables have the same signs as those in
Model 1. We will discuss only the extra statistically significant variables. The coefficient
of Purpose is significantly negative for the post-announcement sample. When firms
raise funds for strategic purposes, they convey information about their prospects. Such
firms thus tend to have a large ratio of good news afterwards.
Although we find some extra statistically significant variables in the GN regression,
the signs are indifferent from those in the SRET regression. Thus, the results for SRET
and GN regressions are robust.
(c) TENOR as Dependent Variable
Model 3 of Table 6 presents the OLS regression results based on equation (3).
The dependent variable, TENOR, reflects the media readers’ measurement of the tenor
of media coverage. The coefficient of MB is significantly positive for both the pre- and
post-announcement periods. For the pre-announcement sample, the coefficient of
ABRET is significantly positive. The coefficient of LnProceeds is positive and statistically
significant for both the pre- and post-announcement samples. Moreover, the coefficient
of changes in ownership concentration (△OWNERSHIP) is statistically negative at the
5% level for the post-announcement sample. The coefficient of DiscretionRatio is
statistically significant at the 1% level for both the pre- and post-announcement
samples. For the tenor of media coverage as reflected by the media readers’ views
(TENOR), news voluntarily released by the issuers is significantly positive during both
the pre- and post-announcement periods. Thus, for media readers, issuers’ voluntary
disclosure behavior is pervasive during both the pre- and post-announcement periods.
The results of the TENOR regression are therefore consistent with those in the
SRET and GN models. The results of our study are thus robust.
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VI. Discussion
Since the results in Section V suggest the possibility that managers of private
placement firms manipulate the media to facilitate their offerings, we seek in this
section to answer the three questions raised at the end of the literature review.
A. The Valence and Tenor of Media Coverage during the Pre- and Post-announcement
Periods
In Table 1, the average SRET and TENOR are positive, and GN is larger than 0.5
during the pre-announcement period, indicating that, on average, private placement
firms tend to have a greater ratio of good news during the pre-announcement period.
This result is even more significant for the post-announcement sample. In Table 2, the
average SRET, GN, and TENOR for the post-announcement sample are all
substantially higher than those for the pre-announcement sample, and the average
number of news reports is also significantly greater during the post-announcement
sample. These results suggest that firms release a higher ratio and volume of good news
during the post-announcement period.
The stronger post-announcement results may indicate that managers have
asymmetric incentives between the two different event periods. During the
post-announcement period, managers have a very strong incentive to release good news
in order to ensure the success of the offerings, while they have a weaker incentive to
release good news to affect the pricing of private placement shares during the
pre-announcement period. Despite the restrictions on the pricing of private placements,
firms can issue private placement shares at any price meeting the market demand as
long as they can provide an independent expert opinion on the reasonableness of the
pricing. Therefore, the efforts made during the pre-announcement period may simply
have little power to increase the price of private placement shares. This argument can
be supported by referring to the price discount of private placements in our sample,
reported in Panel A of Table 7. As suggested by the literature, we measure the discount
as:
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DISCOUNT = (P10 - P0) / P10
where P10 is the share price 10 days after the private placement announcement date,
and P0 denotes the placement price.
The results in Panel A of Table 7 show that the mean discount is 14.3%, while
55% of private placements are offered at a discount higher than 20%, indicating that
over half of private placement shares are offered at fairly high discounts. These results
show that the pricing of private placement is fairly flexible. Since efforts made by
management to increase the price of privately placed shares do not help raise more
proceeds, private placements thus offer a mechanism for reducing the probability of
management timing in equity issues. We thus conjecture that releasing good news
during the pre-announcement period is intended more to facilitate the issue of private
placement shares than to increase their price.
To further explore this phenomenon, we divide the full sample into two groups:
sample firms with changes in the tenor of media coverage greater than zero (rTENOR
＞0) and firms with changes in the tenor of media coverage less than or equal to zero
(rTENOR≦0). We examine whether private placement discounts differ
between‘Positive’ and ‘Non-positive’ changes in the tenor of media coverage
sub-samples. If the private placement discounts for the Positive rTENOR are
significantly greater than those for the Non-positive rTENOR, we may conclude that
an increased tenor of media coverage pushes stock prices up after the announcements,
facilitating private equity offerings.
The first line of Panel B of Table 7 shows that the difference in private placement
discounts between Positive rTENOR and Non-positive rTENOR is 0.043 and does
not significantly differ from zero. However, as discussed in Section V.C, since some
categories of news are easier to manipulate, we investigate whether price discounts vary
with changes in the tenor of media coverage across various types of news. From the
results in Panel B, we find that differences in price discounts are statistically significant
between Positive rTENOR and Non-positive rTENOR in the Strategy/Policy
category (Diff = 0.479) but insignificant in the
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Table 7. Price Discount of Private Placements
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Private Placement Discounts
N

Mea

t-stat.

Min.

n

DISCOUNT

322

0.14

6.618***

-2.141

Median

0.224

Max.

0.712

Std.

The number of

The number of

Discount>20%

Discount<0

Dev.

N

Percentage

N

Percentage

0.387

178

55%

69

21%

3
Panel B: Private Placement Discounts by Changes in The Tenor of Media Coverage (r TENOR) between Pre- and Post-announcement
Period
Category

△TENOR>0 (1)
N

Mean

129

0.169

Sales/Financials

73

Industry/R&D

△TENOR≦0 (2)
N

Mean

5.254***

193

0.125

0.287

4.035***

220

22

0.600

2.556**

Strategy/Policy

61

0.830

Financing

70

Regulation/law
Others

All

t-statistic

Diff (1-2)

t-statistic

Mean

t-statistic

4.340***

0.043

0.987

0.161

4.253***

0.127

1.637

32

0.520

2.850***

0.080

0.272

5.604***

47

0.351

2.957***

0.479

2.414**

0.375

2.372**

85

0.261

6.039***

0.114

0.754

5

0.170

1.386

10

0.648

1.594

-0.478

0.808

9

0.172

1.680

53

0.249

2.702***

-0.077

0.337

The table reports price discount of private placements. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of private placement
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discounts. DISCOUNT = (P10 - P0) / P10. P10 is the share price 10 days after the private placement announcement date,
and P0 denotes the placement price. Panel B reports private placement discounts by changes in the tenor of media
coverage across news categories. rTENOR is the change in the tenor of media coverage between the pre- and
post-announcement period. The pre-announcement period refers to 30 days preceding the private placement
announcement; the post-announcement period refers to 30 days following the announcement. *** and ** indicate
significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively.
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other categories of news, supporting the view that news in the Strategy/Policy category
is used to affect firm stock price following the announcement date. When firm stock
prices rise, the price of privately placed shares is lower and thus more attractive to
investors, which will help firms achieve their fund-raising goals. This evidence supports
the view that firms can engage in news management by releasing a greater ratio of good
news after the announcement date to facilitate the private placements. Our results also
provide evidence that private placements are useful in reducing the adverse selection
problems, which is addressed in our first question in Section III.
B. Is Good News Supported by Operating Performance?
Good news helps firms offer equity privately at higher prices. However, what is
the source of the good news? Lang and Lundholm (2000) suggest that stock prices
could increase with optimistic disclosures because firms’ underlying economic
condition has improved or because managers hype their stock. We assume that the
media release of information on offering firms’ underlying economics absolves
managers of any suspicion of hyping. In Table 6, the coefficient estimates on ROE and
Distress are not statistically significant in any of the three regression models, suggesting
that the valence and tenor of media coverage do not reflect the underlying economics
of private placement firms and that managers strategically manipulate media to achieve
their fund-raising goals. Although it is possible that good news of offering firms is
published due to underlying economic conditions not captured by ROE or Distress,
such as a new order or new patent, we find that a relatively high ratio of good news
discusses the kinds of dreams for the firms’ prospects discussed in Section V.C, such as
the news in the Strategy/Policy and forward-looking categories. We thus conclude that
managers conduct news management to facilitate private placements, in answer to the
first question posed in Section III.
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C. Does It Matter Whether Insiders Participate in Private Placements?
We might assume that managers participating in private placements have no
incentive to hype stock price before they buy shares because higher prices are
unfavorable to them. We explore this issue in the regression models in Table 6. The
coefficients of Managers are not statistically significant in any of the three models
during either the pre- or post- announcement periods. We then check another variable,
ΔOwnership , relevant to insider participation in private placements. The coefficients
of ΔOwnership are negative and statistically significant in both the
pre-announcement and post-announcement samples. These results imply that, if
insiders participate in private placements, it is unnecessary for managers to conduct
news management but that, if the investors are outsiders, managers will strategically
release good news to attract investor attention in order to facilitate the offerings.
Overall, our results suggest that managers tend to release more good news to hype stock
prices in order to raise large proceeds but provide insufficient evidence that insiders
change their disclosure activities for self-interested motives, which answers the second
question posed in Section III.
D. Influences of Firm Characteristics on the Valence and Tenor of Media Coverage
Table 6 shows that small firms (negative coefficient of LnMKT) and firms with
more growth opportunities (positive coefficient of MB) tend to have a greater ratio of
good news in both the pre- and post-announcement samples. Theoretically, small firms
are easily neglected by investors and have a relatively high degree of information
asymmetry. Firms with more growth opportunities or intangible assets are more
difficult to value, and their information asymmetry is thus more severe (Folta and
Janney 2004; Hertzel and Smith 1993; Tan et al. 2002). Therefore, these firms must
enhance their popularity and the public perception of their growth prospects prior to
the private placement announcements. Media is no doubt an appropriate channel. It is
therefore not hard to understand why these firms release a greater ratio of good news.
The results also imply that managers of the offering firms are inclined to release good
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news to mitigate the information asymmetry more than to hype stock prices. This
result helps answer the third question posed in Section III.
E. Influences of Private Placement Characteristics on the Valence and Tenor of Media
Coverage
Private placement characteristics have more impacts on the valence and tenor of
media coverage than do firm characteristics. During the pre-announcement period, if
firms raise larger proceeds, they tend to have a greater ratio of good news, implying that
managers might perform news management to increase the proceeds from private
placements. Pollock and Rindova (2003) suggest that offering size conveys the message
of offering quality and stability to investors; our result is consistent with the view that
firms with larger offering proceeds tend to release a greater ratio of good news.
During the post-announcement period, if firms raise larger proceeds or raise
capital for strategic purposes, they tend to have a larger ratio of good news. Although
larger offering sizes signal more positive information, this also means that the
fund-raising task is more difficult to complete, which provides managers with the
incentive to ensure the success of the offering process. Therefore, the results for the
post-announcement sample might be associated with the issue of managerial news
management.
Private placements with a strategic purpose often convey positive and
forward-looking signals about firms, and issuers prefer to disclose more news about the
content of the strategies. Evidence has been provided in Section V.C that news in the
Strategy/Policy and Financing categories are reported more frequently and positively.
Ho et al. (2010) have similar findings and suggest that, because positive and
forward-looking news is easier to create, issuers might take advantage of this to bias
media coverage, which helps firms improve their image. Our results, that private
placements with a strategic purpose (i.e. through a strategic partnership) obtain better
responses from the market, are not only consistent with the argument in Ho et al.
(2010) but also provide evidence that private placements help reduce the moral hazard
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problems mentioned in Section III.

VII. Conclusion
Using a sample of Taiwanese private placements covering 2006 to 2010, we use
both quantitative and qualitative variables to examine the determinants of the valence
and tenor of media coverage around private placement announcements and study
whether managers strategically perform news management.
We find that issuers pursue news management around private placement
announcements to facilitate the issue process. They tend to have a greater ratio of good
news around the announcement date. The ratio and volume of good news are
significantly higher during the post-announcement period. Before the announcement,
firms strategically release good news to create an atmosphere favorable for private
placements. If managers or insiders participate in private placements, however, they
have no tendency to lead firm stock downwards in order to buy firm shares at low
prices. Issuers continue releasing a greater volume and ratio of good news following the
announcement, a phenomenon that is more obvious if no insiders participate in the
placements.
Concerning news management, voluntarily released news is more forward-looking
and positive and belongs to the Strategy/Policy category. These types of news provide
investors with the issuers’ anticipated future prospects and are relatively easy to create.
In addition, our results suggest that managerial news management around the
announcement occurs more to mitigate information asymmetry than to hype stock
prices, one possible reason being that almost half of our sample firms are in financial
distress. For these firms, surviving and ensuring the success of their offerings are most
critical at this stage.
We provide another kind of evidence that private placements are useful for
resolving adverse selection and moral hazard problems through the power of media.
The pricing of private placements is fairly flexible. Since any efforts made by
management to increase the price of privately placed shares are not helpful in raising
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more proceeds, private placements offer a mechanism for reducing the probability of
management timing in equity issues. The results also free managers of the suspicion of
exploiting windows of opportunity. However, issuers have already created windows of
opportunity for themselves when they release good news. Moreover, our evidence
shows that private placements with strategic investors release more positive and
forward-looking news and receive better responses from the market, showing that
private placements are favorable for mitigating moral hazard problems.
The literature has discovered the earnings management phenomenon in private
placements. Our study extends the private placement literature concerning news
management by using both qualitative and quantitative variables to examine issuers’
potential for news management around private placement announcements. The results
provide evidence that managers have incentives to affect investors’ perception of firms
in order to facilitate private placements. Although the media and private placements
both mitigate information asymmetry in the issue process, our results suggest that the
effect is obviously limited in improving the opaque condition of the capital market.
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